Background and Dispute
In Premcor Pipeline Co. v. Wingate, No. 09-22-00117-CV, 2024 WL 1565334 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 11, 2024, no pet.), among the issues addressed by the Beaumont Court of Appeals was whether the trial court erred by permanently fixing a width of twenty feet to a pipeline easement without a defined width. By way of background, Premcor owns two pipelines that cross over Wingate’s property. Wingate’s property is burdened by nine recorded easement (the 1954 Gulf Easements) that are now owned by Premcor. The 1954 Gulf Easements allow Premcor to maintain and operate pipelines but do not specify the width of the right-of-way (ROW). Wingate filed a lawsuit against Premcor after a dispute arose regarding Premcor’s intended use of roads and bridges on Wingate’s property.
Wingate's Claims and Trial Court’s Ruling
Wingate requested declaratory relief, arguing that Premcor was exceeding its easement rights, and requested a permanent injunction to restrict Premcor’s use of his property to a fixed width based on the existing pipeline’s size. Wingate contended that the width of the ROW should be determined by the “circumference” of the pipelines, and he sought to prevent Premcor from using roads and bridges that were constructed after the easements were granted. Premcor argued that the 1954 Gulf Easements are general easements with no specified width, entitling Premcor to reasonable use of the land, including using existing roads for pipeline maintenance. Premcor filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief, seeking confirmation that it had the right to use the land as reasonably necessary for the operation and maintenance of its pipelines, with no fixed width for the ROW.
Application of the “Fixed and Certain” Doctrine
The trial court issued a temporary injunction in favor of Wingate, limiting Premcor’s access to a twenty-foot easement, citing the “fixed and certain” nature of the easement as established by the pipeline’s installation. Wingate later sought to make the temporary injunction permanent, and the court granted declaratory relief that fixed the easement’s width at twenty feet. The trial court’s decision to limit the ROW to a twenty-foot width was based on the interpretation that the easement became “fixed and certain” after the pipeline was laid, following the Texas Supreme Court’s Dwyer case. Relevantly, in Dwyer, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a grant of easement rights for a specific use becomes “fixed and certain” once the use is established, and any significant change (like increasing the size of the pipeline) would require a new agreement or specific authorization in the original easement. Notably, in that case, the defendant was granted the right to “lay, construct, maintain, operate, and repair” a pipeline. However, when the defendant replaced the original 18-inch pipeline with a substantially larger 30-inch pipeline, the Court held that the easement did not authorize that change in size. The enlargement of the pipeline was deemed outside the scope of the original easement, which was considered “fixed and certain” when the 18-inch line was installed. Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant’s rights did not extend to replacing the original pipeline with one of a substantially larger size.
Appeal and Analysis by the Beaumont Court of Appeals
Premcor appealed, arguing that the 1954 Gulf Easements should not be rewritten to include a fixed width on the basis that general easements without a specified width should allow for reasonable and necessary use.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s interpretation was incorrect because pursuant to SWEPCO, “[t]he use of a general easement without a fixed width is a strategic decision that does not render an easement ambiguous or require a court to supply the missing width.” Instead, the court held that the easements should be interpreted based on the purpose for which they were granted, and the use should be reasonable and necessary without causing undue burden to the servient estate (in this case, Wingate’s property). The court emphasized that the lack of a specified width in a general easement does not make it ambiguous and does not justify the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prescribe a fixed width, which the trial court had considered in reaching its decision. Looking solely at the language in the 1954 Gulf Easements, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in permanently fixing a twenty-foot width to the 1954 Gulf Easements. It further noted that Wingate purchased his properties knowing they were encumbered by the 1954 Gulf Easements and thus he had notice that his properties were burdened by general easements with no defined width and that Premcor had the right of ingress and egress to and from the described tracts of land for the purpose of maintaining and repairing the pipeline.
Distinguishing Dwyer and Interpreting the Easement Language
The appellate court also distinguished Dwyer, noting that the easement in Dwyer was an “over, across and through” easement, lacking broad, forward-looking language like the 1954 Gulf Easements, which granted Premcor the right to “do whatever may be requisite for the enjoyment of the rights herein granted,” including the right to “lay, maintain, renew, change the size of, and restore” the pipelines. Relevantly, the Dwyer easement did not include rights to increase the size of the pipeline or lay additional pipelines, and it did not prescribe a course or location for the pipeline. The court also pointed out that Dwyer did not address whether a court could rewrite a general easement to include a fixed width, which was the central issue in Premcor Pipeline Co.
Permanent Injunction Reversed
Finally, Premcor also appealed the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction that limited its use of the easement to a twenty-foot strip. The court ruled that Wingate had not met the required elements for a permanent injunction, specifically failing to prove a wrongful act, imminent harm, or irreparable injury. Since Premcor had not trespassed on Wingate’s property or shown any intention to exceed its easement rights, the court determined that the injunction was not justified.[29] It vacated the permanent injunction, stating that fear of future harm was insufficient to warrant injunctive relief.
